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The Future of Social Security:
An Update
INCE ITS CREATION in 1935, the Social
Security system has become an integral part of
the U.S. economic and social structure. With the
composition of the population currently
undergoing substantial change, however, skep-
ticism abounds among U.S. citizens (particularly
those between 25 and 45 years old) as to
whether the Social Security system, as currently
structured, can survive into the middle of the
21st century.1
In a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal, a
1990 Gallup poll indicated that “47% of Ameri-
cans do not believe that Social Security will be
able to pay them any benefit when they retire.”
These results suggest that the public’s thinking
about the viability of Social Security has changed
little over the last 10 years. Myers (1985) reports
similar results for polls taken in 1980. This
skepticism continues despite the 1983 enactment
of the recommendations of President Reagan’s
National Commission on Social Security Reform.~
This legislation was designed to put the Social
‘The challenges of an aging population are common in
most industrial countries. See Halter and Hemming (1987).
2Rasmussen (1990).
3These were the 1983 amendments to the Social Security
Act, which will be discussed further below.
41n February 1984, President Reagan, in his annual budget
message, declared: “The Social Security system has been
rescued from the threat of insolvency raised by rampant
Security system on sound financial footing until
2056.~
This article provides an update on the finan-
cial status of the Social Security system and ad-
dresses concern about its long-run financial
viability.~The fundamental economic and demo-
graphic assumptions that underlie estimates of
the system’s future costs and income are ex-
amined to determine the system’s financial via-
bility. This evaluation provides the basis for
determining whether the skepticism about Social
Security’s future is justified.
THE 1983 SOCIAL SECURITY
AMENDMENTS
The Social Security Act has been amended
many times over the years, with the amend-
ments changing coverage, insured status, benefit
formulas and financing provisions. One of the
most sweeping changes took place in 1984,
inflation, excessive liberalizations, and lagging growth of
its tax base.” Office of Management and Budget (1984).
5Social Security is defined as Old-Age and Survivors In-
surance (OASI), Disability Insurance (Dl) and Hospital In-
surance (HI), also referred to as Medicare, Part A.
OASI + DI = OASDI and OASDI + HI = OASDHI. Sup-
plementary Medical Insurance (SMI), also referred to as
Medicare, Part B, is discussed only briefly since it is a












Ifollowing the passage of the 1983 amendments,
which were based on the Report of the National
Commission on Social Security Reform.°
The 1983 amendments produced the following
changes:’
(1) Mandatory coverage was extended to all
newly hired federal employees and
employees of nonprofit organizations.
(2) The cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) was
delayed for six months. Also, a provision
was introduced that based the COLA on
the lower of wage increases or consumer
prices when the trust fund is low.
(3) A phased-in increase in the normal retire-
ment age was enacted.
(4) Scheduled increases in the Old-Age and
Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
payroll tax rate were accelerated.
(5) Payroll taxes were raised for self-employed
individuals with a partial offset in the form
of a tax credit.
(6) A portion of OASDI benefits became sub-
ject to income taxes with such taxes re-
turned to the trust fund.
These amendments increased the balance in
the OASDI trust funds almost immediately. De-
spite the magnitude of this legislation and its
surplus-generating effects, however, the public
apparently remains unconvinced about Social
Security’s long-run viability.~
THE 1990 SOCIAL SECURITY
REPORTS
Each of the Social Security trust funds is gov-
erned by a Board of Trustees, which is required
to submit an annual report to Congress. Though
the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)
Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance (DI)
Fund are separate, one report covers both funds;
a separate report is prepared for the Hospital
Insurance (HI) Fund. These documents report
the status of the trust funds only; they make no
recommendations for legislation?
Terms and Procedures
These reports summarize recent developments
in the trust funds’ financial operations and, more
importantly, assess the funds’ actuarial status.
This assessment is made by developing various
assumptions about economic growth, productivi-
ty, inflation, unemployment and demographics
(fertility, mortality and immigration), then exam-
ining the program’s projected income and outgo.
These projections provide the basis for assessing
both the short-run and long-run status of the
funds.
The short-run assessment focuses on the ade-
quacy of reserves to pay benefits for the next
five years. The principal measure used to assess
the short-run “liquidity” of the fund is the con-
tingency fund ratio. This ratio, which is defined
as the amount in the trust fund at the begin-
ning of the year divided by anticipated expen-
ditures in that year, reflects the accumulation
of interest earnings in the fund.
The long-run assessment focuses on income
and outgo for a 75-year projection period. Sev-
eral measures are used to assess the system’s
long-run “solvency.” The most commonly used
measure is the comparison of average annual
income (excluding interest earnings on trust
funds) with average annual cost, both expressed
as a percent of “taxable payrolL”°The income
rate is the combined payroll contribution rate
as scheduled in the law plus taxation of benefits,
expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll.
The cost rate is the annual outgo (benefits plus
administrative expense) expressed as a percen-
tage of taxable payroll. The difference between
these rates can be averaged over a period of
years to determine the fund’s “actuarial
balance.”
Another measure of actuarial balance over the
long run is the present value of future income
(excluding interest), outgo and taxable payroll,
6This is commonly referred to as “the Greenspan Commis-
sion,” after Alan Greenspan, its chairman. The commis-
sion was created by President Reagan in 1981 as a
response to the continuing deterioration of the OASI trust
fund. Its report was published in January 1983.
‘For further discussion, see Svahn and Ross (1983) and
Myers (1985), pp. 282-99.
8For a critical review of the Commission’s report, see
Robertson (1985).
9This is left to the Advisory Council on Social Security,
which is appointed every four years.
‘°“Taxablepayroll” is defined as the earnings on which
employees, employers and self-employed persons make



















awhich includes the trust fund balance at the
beginning of the period. This measure was in-
troduced in 1988. For the OASDI funds, a long-
range (75-year) income rate between 95 percent
and 105 percent of the long-range cost rate
traditionally indicates the program is adequately
financed.
A series of projected contingency fund ratios
also can be calculated over a long-run period. If
a trust fund becomes depleted during the pro-
jection period, the year in which this occurs
provides a summary measure of the financial
condition of the fund.
Assumptions
Projections of Social Security’s future income
and outgo reflect a host of assumptions about
economic conditions and demographic factors.”
The factors influencing income are those that
affect the size and composition of the working
population and the general level of earnings.
The factors influencing outgo are those that af-
fect the size and composition of the beneficiary
population and the general level of benefits.
In its annual Social Security reports, the Board
of Trustees presents four sets of economic and
demographic assumptions. Alternative I presents
the most optimistic outlook, including the fastest
economic growth and the lowest inflation. Alter-
natives Il-A and TI-B are intermediate ones that
share the same demographic assumptions; Il-A
has faster growth and lower inflation than Il-B.
Alternative III provides the most pessimistic
outlook, with the slowest growth, highest infia-
llSee Myers (1985), pp. 387-90.
tion and least favorable demographic assump-
tions. The Board of Trustees typically focuses
on alternative Il-B.
Whether a variable is classified as part of the
optimistic or pessimistic alternatives depends
solely on its effect on the Social Security system.
For example, the highest death rate (and, thus,
shortest life expectancy) appears in the optimis-
tic alternative. For the economic factors, the op-
timistic case assumes the fastest real growth
and the lowest inflation rate. These projections
“are intended to be indicators of the trend and
range of future income and outgo, under a vari-
ety of plausible economic and demographic con-
ditions.”12 The analysis is intended to present a
range of possible outcomes, rather than make
an exact prediction.
Demographic Assutnptions~-The key demo-
graphic factors used to derive these projections
are the fertility rate, the death rate and net im-
migration. Table 1 summarizes the assumptions
contained in the 1990 Social Security reports.
The optimistic alternative contains a combina-
tion of demographic factors, each of which has
the effect of raising the proportion of workers
to beneficiaries. The pessimistic alternative re-
flects just the opposite: a combination of factors,
each of which lowers the worker-beneficiary
ratio. The demographic assumptions for the in-
termediate alternatives are about halfway be-
tween these two. Each variable reaches its
ultimate value at different times: the fertility
rate reaches its ultimate value in 2015; life ex-
pectancy changes slowly reaching this value in
“Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age (1990), p. 33.
35
Table 1
Demographic Assumptions (Ultimate Values): 1990 Social Security Reports
Optimistic assumption Intermediate assumption Pessimistic assumption
Demographic measure 1989 Alternative I Alternatives Il-A & Il-B Alternative Ill
Fertility rate (lifetime 1,930 2,200 1 .900 1.600
oirths per 1.000 women)
Mortality rate (life 75.1 778 80.6 844
expectancy at birth
.n years)
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2065; the immigration numbers presumably
apply beginning in 1995.13
Figure 1 summarizes the beneficiary-worker
ratio implied by these demographic assump-
tions. Alternative III, the pessimistic projection,
shows a generally rapid rise in the ratio through-
out the projection period. The intermediate pro-
jections indicate that the problems inherent in a
rising ratio will be most serious from about
2010 to 2030. This corresponds “roughly” to the
period dated 65 years from the beginning and
end of the baby boom—1946-64. The optimistic
projection shows an increase from 2010 to 2030,
then a slight decline from 2030 to 2065.
Economic Assumptions—The key economic
assumptions are summarized in table 2. The op-
timistic alternative includes the most favorable
of each economic assumption, in combination
with the most favorable of demographic as-
sumptions. In other words, it includes the fastest
GNP growth, the lowest inflation, the lowest
unemployment rate and the fastest growth in
real wages. The pessimistic alternative reflects
recurring business cycles and generally weak
growth with high inflation. Of the two inter-
mediate projections, A reflects more favorable
economic assumptions than B.
The key economic assumption is the relation-
ship between wages and prices, that is, the
growth in real wages. This measure captures
two important facets of the Social Security sys-
tem: the nominal wage is the basis for estimat-
ing Social Security income, and, with benefits
tied to movements in the price level, projected
consumer price index (CPI) movements provide
an indication of changes in Social Security costs.















“The Social Security reports assume that most variables





The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age (1990)
report indicates that Social Security income, ex-
pressed as a percent of taxable payroll, is little
affected by different assumptions about the
growth of real wages. With the maximum
amount of earnings that are taxable tied auto-
matically to the increase in average wages, the
income rate is essentially the OASDI contribu-
tion rate scheduled in the law.”
Social Security outgo relative to taxable pay-
roll, however, is sensitive to the growth of real
wages. In particular, an increase in the real
wage decreases benefit costs as a percent of
taxable payroll. For example, if wages increase
faster, while inflation is unchanged, taxable
payroll will increase with little change in benefit
costs.
Status of the Trust Funds
OASIJI—The status of the OASI fund and the
DI funds are presented both separately and
together in the Board of Trustees, Federal Old-
Age report. For purposes of this summary, only
the combined status is presented.
Figure 2 shows the contingency fund ratio for
the OASDI funds, both historically and for the
four alternative sets of projections through 2065.
The Board is required to assess the short-run
status (the next five years) of the trust funds. It
“There is a slight effect reflecting credit for income taxes
attributable to partial taxation of benefits. Because the in-
come thresholds are constant according to present law,
the credits to the trust funds will be a smaller proportion of
taxable payroll for the more optimistic proiections.
is clear from the figure that the funds are liquid
for this horizon. Even under the most pessimis-
tic alternative, the funds are not depleted until
2023. For the immediate future (until almost
2010), the number of OASDI beneficiaries rel-
ative to the number of covered workers does
not rise sharply (see figure 1). Thus, the current
schedule for the payroll tax indicates rising trust
fund balances until the 2010s, regardless of
which set of projections is used.
For the long run, however, conclusions about
the viability of the funds vary, depending on
the set of assumptions. According to figure 2,
without further legislation, the funds will be
depleted somewhere between 2023 and 2056,
unless the optimistic economic-demographic pro-
jections occur.
Figure 3 shows another method that the
Board uses to determine the actuarial status of
the trust funds. It is a chart of the income rates
and cost rates (both expressed as a percentage
of taxable payroll) - The income rates exclude in-
terest income on assets and are essentially the
same for each set of assumptions, varying only
to the extent that taxation of benefits varies
with the assumptions. The projected departure
from past patterns shown in figure 3 is quite
dramatic. The variation in the annual surplus or
deficit relative to taxable payroll is very small
ThWith the denominator increasing faster than the
numerator, the ratio falls. See Board of Trustees, Federal





























from 1940 to 1985 compared with what is
scheduled to come. The years in which the pro-
grams start running a deficit occur somewhat
earlier than when the trust funds are depleted
(see figure 2).
111—The Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital
(1990) report indicates that, even though it is
currently in surplus and will continue so for a
few years, the fund will be depleted by about
2005 under the intermediate assumptions.”
With the pessimistic set of assumptions, the
report indicates the fund will be depleted by
1999; under the optimistic assumptions it will
be depleted by 2018.
Figure 4 shows the long-term projections of
income and outgo for the hospital insurance
fund until 2060. This figure shows that the
surpluses currently being experienced are likely
to be short-lived. The switch to growing deficits
will occur even before the number of beneficia-
ries for the OASDI system increases, primarily
reflecting a much faster rise in the cost of hos-
pital care per beneficiary than the rise in tax-
able earnings.
The Board of Trustees of the HI fund reports
that
[nlot only are the anticipated reserves and financ-
ing of the HI program inadequate to offset this
demographic change [the decline in covered ~rork-
ers per HI enrolled, but under all but the most
optimistic assumptions, the trust fund is projected
to become exhausted even before the major demo-
graphic shift begins to occur.
The Board, therefore, urges that the Congress
take early remedial measures to bring future HI
program costs and financing into balance, and to
“Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital (1990). This report
was prepared before legislation was recently enacted in-
creasing the maximum for earnings taxable under
Medicare, Part A, to $125,000. In addition, the deductible
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Figure 4
Hospital Insurance Income and Outgo
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S1990 REPORT COMPARED WITH
1983 REPORT
The 1983 amendments supposedly put the
Social Security system on firm financial ground.
As noted above, the amendments affected main-
ly the OASDI program rather than Medicare.
Has there been any erosion in this footing since
1983? If so, why?
Status of the Trust Funds
0<48131—Table 3 compares the most recent
report of the status of the OASDI funds from
the Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age (1990)
with those from 1982 and 1983. The 1983
amendments were a response to the short-run
crisis facing the system at that time. A com-
parison of the 1982 and 1983 reports indicates
that the amendments appeared to put the sys-
tem on sound financial footing. As the 1990 col-
umn in table 3 indicates, however, substantial
deterioration has occurred since 1983. On a
combined basis, the trust funds are projected to
be depleted during the projection period for all
alternatives except the most optimistic, Alter-
native I. The seriousness of this projection
change is difficult to discern; the direction of
movement, however, is cause for concern.
40
HI—Comparing the status of the HI trust
fund in 1990 with that of 1983 indicates that
not all surprises are bad news. In its 1983
report, the Board concluded that
[t]ax Iates currently specified in the law... are
sufficient, along with interest earnings and assets
in the fund, to support program expenditures only
over the next six to seven years.”
More specifically, the fund was projected to be
depleted by no later than 1996 with the op-
timistic projections, by either 1990 or 1991 with
the intermediate assumptions and as early as
1988 with the pessimistic projections. Clearly,
these projections were wrong, chiefly because
of errors in projecting the costs of the pro-
gram.19 The schedule of tax rates in effect in
1983 was not changed as of 1990. The 1990
report indicates that the fund will be depleted
as early as 1999 and as late as 2019.
A Review of the 1983-.89
Experience
Despite the gloomier outlook suggested in
table 3, the trust funds’ experience since 1983
has been more favorable than was projected in
1983. Table 4 shows the status of the funds in
the 1980s and the 1983 alternative projections.
While the OASDI trust fund balance moved
quite closely with the optimistic set of projec-
tions, the health insurance fund balance far ex-
ceeded the most optimistic projections. These
“Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital (1990), pp. 11-12.
“Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital (1983), p. 49.
“For a summary of the changes in the provisions in the ad-
ministration of Medicare, Part A, see Social Security























outcomes suggest that there is much greater
uncertainty connected with the health insurance
trust funds because of the difficulty in forecast-
ing costs of medical care. Estimates of the vi-
ability of the health insurance trust funds have
tended to be too pessimistic.
To isolate whether the 1983-89 outcome for
the trust funds %vas attributable to demographic
or economic factors, tables 5 and 6 summarize
the actual experience over this period and com-
pares it with the 1983 projections. The demo-
graphic projections were quite accurate except
for net immigration, which was higher than
estimated. The economic experience was gen.
erally consistent with the more optimistic pro-
jections made in 1983. The actual growth of
real wages was midway between alternatives I
and lI-A. Given the uncertainty that prevailed in
1983 about the strength and longevity of the ex-
pansion, it is not surprising that the experience
during the long expansion matches more closely
the optimistic projections.
20ln 1983, the HI funds were projected for only 25 years and
were projected to deplete quickly.
21The numbers in this table are values for the last year of
the projection period—2060 for the 1983 report and 2065
The 1983 report received considerable atten-
tion because of the surpluses it projected, re-
flecting the 1983 amendments. For the Alter-
native It-B projections, the balance in the OASDI
fund was projected to be nearly $21 trillion by
2045.20 In the 1990 report, the largest balance
for the lI-B projection is now estimated at $9.2
trillion in 2025. Figure 5 summarizes the 11-B
projections for both the 1983 and the 1990
reports. The source of the revisions requires
further investigation, especially since the eco-
nomic-demographic experience during the 1983-
89 period was more favorable than projected.
Table 7 summarizes the demographic assump-
tions for the 1983 and 1990 reports.2’ The fer-
tility rate generally has been revised downward,
and projected life expectancy and net annual
immigration have been revised upward. One
way to summarize these demographic effects is
for the 1990 report. These are to be distinguished from the
numbers in table $ which were averages for the 1983-89










How Projections Have Changed











Accuracy of 1983 Demographic Assumptions for 1983-89 Period
Demographic measure Actual Alternative I Alternative li-A Alternative li-B Alternative Iii
Fertility rate (lifetime 1.860 1.940 1 .880 1.880 1.800
births per 1,000
women)
Mortality rate (life 748 74.6 753 75.3 76.0
expectancy at birth
in years)
Net annua! immigration 612 450 400 400 350
(thousands of persons)
Table 6
Accuracy of 1983 Economic Assumptions for 1983-89 Period
indicator Actual Alternative I Alternative li-A Alternative li-B Alternative iii
Real GNP growth rate 3.9% 4.6°/o 4 0% 3.2°/c 2.5%
Annual wage growth rate 5.3 5.2 5.0 5.3 6 1
CPI-W rate of change 3.4 30 33 4.3 5.9
Real wage growth rate i ~2 3 1 7 1.0 0.2
Unemployment rate—end of 5.3 5.6 58 6.9 78
period. 1989
to look at the projected ratio of beneficiaries to
employment. Figure 6 shows that there has
been a substantial upward revision in the ratio
of beneficiaries to covered employment since
1983. This indicates that OASDI expenditures
are revised upward relative to income. Revision
of this ratio reflects mainly a downward revi-
sion of projected employment.
Table 8 shows the economic assumptions for
the 1983 and 1990 reports.22 Despite an eco-
nomic performance that conformed most closely
with the 1983 optimistic projection, the econom-
‘2Like table 7, these ultimate values are for the last year of
the projection period, and have to be distinguished from
the numbers in table 6, which cover the 1983-89 period.
ic projections were revised downward from
1983 to 1990. The nature of the revision can be
summarized most simply by looking at the real
GNP growth rate. These projections were re-
vised downward by 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent.
The ultimate unemployment rate was revised
upward from 0.5 percent to 1 percent, and the
growth rate of real wages was revised
downward by 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent. While
these differences might appear small, they have
significantly different implications about the
future of the Social Security system when car-





nccro,,r 0A7UV flr CT fl~UC a43
Figure 5









Ratio of OASDI Beneficiaries to Covered







N tM~n1ssfle~tS 50 40 64 60 70 55
























2020 2035 2050 2065 I
I
I
Real GNP growth rate 2.7% 3 2% 1 8% 23% 1 5°o 1 9% 0 SC/c 0 fii.,~
Average wage growth 42 45 4.7 50 5.3 58 60
rate
CPI-W rate of crange 20 20 3.0 3.0 4 0 4.0 50 S.C






FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS1 45
Figure 7
OASDI Trust Fund Balance
(Alternative lI-B), 1990 vs. 1983
Figure 7 summarizes the trust fund balances
for Alternative H-fl from the two reports as a
percent of GNP. Once again, the difference is
striking. As a percent of GNP, the OASDI trust
fund balances are now projected to be higher
until 2015, before peaking at 25 percent, and
then falling to zero by 2043, instead of 2063, as
projected in 1983.
THE CONSISTENCY OF PROJEC-
TION ASSUMPTIONS
The point of the alternative projections is to
“present a range of generally consistent sets of
economic assumptions which have been de-
signed to encompass most of the possibilities
that might be encountered.fl23 The intermediate
alternatives are considered the most probable.
23Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age (1990), p. 35.
24lbid., p. 149.
2SThis relationship is discussed at length in U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (1988).
In fact, the official statement of opinion by the
chief actuary refers only to the 11-B alter-
native.24
While the projected values of the other eco-
nomic variables are presumably consistent with
the assumed rates of real growth, their consis-
tency is not actually examined in these reports.
In this section, we examine the projections’ in-
ternal consistency by looking at trends in pro-
ductivity and real wages, capital formation and
immigration.
Productivity and Real Wages
Productivity growth is a key determinant of
the growth in real wages.25 Table 9 summarizes
U.S. productivity and real wage trends since






















JANUARY/FEBRUARy 1991a 0.9 percent average annual rate, while pro-
ductivity grew at a 1.6 percent rate. Most of the
growth in earnings and productivity occurred
before 1968. Since then, productivity has ex-
panded at a 1.2 percent annual rate and real
earnings growth has been essentially zero. While
the 1970s were buffeted by supply-side shocks,
the 1980s seem to have been characterized by
stagnant productivity and earnings growth. Thus,
in light of the experience of the last two de-
cades, all four alternatives appear relatively
optimistic -
Another way to evaluate the real wage as-
sumption is to examine forecasts based on infor-
mation contained in its own past movement.
Figure 8 gives one such forecast for the 1990s.2°
The average rate of change for the real wage
forecast for the 1989-99 period is —0.3 percent,
which falls below the pessimistic alternative of
0.2 percent. Indeed, except for Alternative III,
all the projections of real wage growth lie out-
side the forecasted 95 percent confidence
bands.27
Production Function Implications
Another way to evaluate these alternatives is
to examine the growth in the capital stock that
would be required to provide the projected
GNP, given the assumption about employment
growth.28 Table 10 summarizes the results of
these calculations and shows the 1948-89 period
for comparison.
The optimistic Allernative I, with a growth
rate of real GNP of 2.7 percent for the next 75
years, appears unattainable, given past U.S. ex-
perience. Based on relationships that prevailed
over the last 40 years, the capital stock would
have to grow 7 percent per year for the next
75 years. The fastest rate that the capital stock
grew in any single year during the 1948-89
period was 5.4 percent in 1966.29
The lI-A alternative implies a growth of per
capita GNP of 1.62 percent per year. With em-
ployment projected to grow at a 0.18 percent
rate, the capital stock would have to grow at a
4.66 percent annual rate over the 75-year pro-
jection period. From 1948 to 1989, the capital
stock grew that fast only four times.
Table 9
Growth Rates of Productivity and Real
Wages
-- Productivity Annual real wages





Alternative I 2 22 2
Alternative lI-A 1.9 1.7
Alternative lI-B 1.7 1 3
Alternative il 1 4 0.8
flates of rhange are ultimate values
The annual reports suggest that Alternative II-
B is the “most realistic” one. As noted earlier, it
is based on the same demographic assumptions
as lI-A, but its economic assumptions are more
pessimistic. The implied growth of the capital
stock of 3.12 percent seems reasonable, given
the historical record.
Finally, Alternative III presumes very slow
growth in the capital stock. Such a growth rate is
easily achievable, given the postwar experience.
Although the alternative projections in the
Social Security annual reports appear to be con-
sistent with past experience, there is little in-
dication of the probability that could be as-
signed to their occurrence. A closer analysis of
these alternatives indicates that, based on his-
torical relationships between capital, labor and
output, the optimistic alternative is quite un-
likely to occur. Furthermore, the intermediate
lI-A projection also appears overly optimistic. As
a result, to assess the future of Social Security,
attention should be focused on the more proba-
ble alternatives, Il-B and Ill.
Immigration
Another way to examine the alternative as-
sumptions is to consider to what extent immi-
gration, rather than the capital stock, could be
changed so as to achieve the different alterna-
cent during the 1989-99 period. These confidence bands
are not shown on figure 8
28For a description of the methodology underlying these



















2OThis is derived by fitting a Box-Jenkins model (ARMA) to
the percent change in the real wage (adiusted for trend).
271f real wages continue to move as they have historically,
there is a9 5percent probability that the rate of change of
real wages will average between -1.6 percent and 0.9 per
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Figure 8
Real Wage
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JANUARY/FEBRUARy 1991tives.~° Once again, the feasibility of alternatives
I and lI-A appears doubtful.
Real GNP growth in Alternative lI-A could be
achieved with a growth rate of employment of
0.46 percent per year if the capital stock grew
at its 1948-89 trend rate of 3.60 percent. Based
on Census Bureau estimates of the impact of im-
migration on total population, this employment
growth could be achieved with immigration of
about one million persons per year from 1990
to 2065.~’This is 200,000 more than the Census
Bureau’s high-immigration assumption.
Applying the same methodology to Alternative
I indicates the limitations of immigration policy
in boosting GNP growth. Achieving the 2.68 per-
cent growth rate in real GNP would require im-
migration of almost four million persons per
year over the 1990-2065 period.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Social Security system was created in
1935 and has withstood 50-plus years of substan-
tial social, economic, demographic and political
change. Its evolution has not been smooth, how-
ever, and several financing crises have occurred.
Partly as a result of these periodic crises, the
American public has become increasingly skep-
tical about Social Security’s future. This skepti-
cism reflects primarily concern about the fi-
nancing of the retirement and medical needs of
the baby-boom generation, those persons born
between 1.946 and 1964. Coupled with a low
birth rate in the 1970s and 1980s, the evolving
demographics indicate a sharp drop in the labor
force relative to the total population beginning
in about 2010-15.
One of the most important pieces of Social
Security legislation was the amendments of
1983, which resulted from the recommenda-
tions of the National Commission on Social
Security Reform. As a result of these amend-
ments, the system, many thought, was placed
on a sound financial footing. By accelerating the
scheduled increase in payroll taxes and design-
ing a plan of phasing in increases in retirement
age, the amendments were intended to expand
the system’s trust funds sharply in the 1990s
and early 2000s, thereby easing the burden on
future workers of providing for the needs of
the retiring baby-boom generation.
This article focused on the 1990 annual re-
ports of the Social Security trust funds to deter-
mine if the status of those funds has changed
since 1983. It showed that the projected sur-
pluses are now smaller than initially forecast,
even though the 1983-89 economic experience
was more favorable than had been expected.
The OASDI fund is not in short-run danger of
being depleted; however, it is now projected to
be depleted in 2043. Moreover, the hospital in-
surance fund is headed for depletion in 2003.
These dates of depletion are based on the in-
termediate lI-B projection, which the system’s
Board of Trustees considers the most probable.
In addition, the system’s own actuary concludes
that the trust funds, based on its own guide-
lines, are not actuarially sound.
A review of the assumptions that underlie this
revised outlook showed that the downward
revisions chiefly reflected forecasts of slower
real economic growth. The financial condition
of the Social Security system is affected par-
ticularly by a downward revision in real wage
and productivity growth.
Using production function relationships de-
rived from the 1948-89 experience, an analysis
of the projections presented in the 1990 Social
Security report indicated that attention is pro-
perly focused on the Il-B assumptions. Recent
economic experience suggests, however, that
the pessimistic projections cannot be ignored.
An examination of immigration possibilities and
a time series analysis of real wages also sug-
gested that pessimistic alternatives lI-B and III
are more likely to occur than alternatives I and
Il-A, which are more optimistic. Recent produc-
tivity trends suggest that the near-term Social
Security surpluses will be smaller than generally
expected and the far-term deficits will be much
larger.
The key role of economic assumptions in pro-
jecting income and outgo for the Social Security
system suggests that the nation’s macroeconom-
ic policy is vital to its long-run viability, especially
to the extent that such policy can influence
long-term growth. The country’s underlying
demographics have set the stage for potential
30For an extensive discussion of the economic effects of im-
migration, see Simon (1989).
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problems in the 21st century; barring further
major changes in immigration policy, there is lit-
tle that can be done to alter these trends.32
The future of Social Security is clouded by
the changing demographics. While Social Securi-
ty trust funds are currently in surplus and bal-
ances are building, projections of future sur-
pluses are being revised downward. Nonetheless,
these surpluses are projected to continue for
the next 20-25 years. Looking 75 years into the
future, however, these surpluses, even if real-
ized, would be relatively short-lived.
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